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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses compliance with the 2004/35/CE 
Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) in Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Greece and Italy. Their compliance 
with the ELD reflects in how far pro-environmental 
‘actions’ have been taken. Comparing compliance with 
environmental statements or ‘values’ made in their 
national parliaments displays to what extent there is a 
mismatch between values and actions, or a ‘value-action 
gap’. The four countries each represent one of the Four 
Worlds of Implementation, a model by Falkner and Treib 
studying general patterns of compliance with EU 
Directives. The ELD furthers the polluter-pays principle 
evident in the Kyoto Protocol. In this regard, the value-
action gap helps identifying problem areas in European 
climate governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite climate change becoming increasingly evident, a 
negative trend can be observed in terms of enforceability 
and commitment in climate treaties. The 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol contains binding commitments for its ratifying 
parties, unlike its successor, the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
Combatting climate change, despite great concern, seems to 
lose priority at a time where it deserves our uttermost 
attention. Thus, an environmental value-action gap is 
evident. How has the value-action gap in the post-Kyoto 
European Union influenced transposition and 
implementation of EU environmental legislation? 
 
PARLIAMENTARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
The Kyoto Protocol may be regarded as one of the first 
international political responses to climate change. This 
paper argues that the polluter-pays principle is the 
cornerstone of the Protocol, ensuring that the countries 
which have polluted most should take the lead in 
preventing further pollution (Faure, Gupta & Nentjes, 
2003, p. 13-15). The polluter-pays principle is evident in 
both the Articles and flexible market mechanisms of the 
Protocol and holds parliaments accountable for tackling 
climate change. 
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Polluter-pays principle 
The polluter-pays principle is evident in the Kyoto 
Articles, as these provide binding commitments for its 
ratifying parties. These commitments require parties to 
reduce overall emissions by at least five percent in 2008-
2012 compared to the base year, which is in most cases 
1990 (Kyoto Protocol, 1997, Article 3). Moreover, 
national systems must be in place to meet these goals and 
progress is reported annually to expert teams (1997, 
Article 5, 7-8). Furthermore, the ratifying parties are 
indeed the most polluting, namely nearly the entire 
continent of Europe, the United States and Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, Japan and Russia (1997, 
Annex I). 
 
Similarly Kyoto’s flexible market mechanisms further the 
polluter-pays principle. International Emissions Trading 
(IET) places a cap on the total amount of emission 
allowances, and allocates sustainable development to 
enterprises where this is economically most beneficial. 
Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) allow polluters to invest in 
sustainable projects abroad whilst adding the reduced 
emissions to their own account. However, a limited 
amount of credits may come from these mechanisms, 
forcing Annex I countries to take domestic action 
(Derouin, Bellamy, Nelson & Freeze, 2007, p. 1-7). 
Parliamentary accountability 
Climate change is a political question, which parliaments 
and governments should solve. First, the liberalisation of 
energy markets makes investors unlikely candidates to 
support sustainable technologies and renewable energy 
sources, as carbon is still the main pillar of this market 
(Faure et al., 2003, p. 16). Second, climate change is an 
urgent question as it is already taking place. As 
parliaments and governments in democratic countries 
with parliamentary systems both have legislative powers, 
they are the only players with immediate power to draft 
and enforce laws. Parliaments eventually pull the strings 
by making legislation by themselves, and approving or 
refusing legislation proposed by governments (Heringa & 
Kiiver, 2012, p. 20-22). Third, as climate change has 
been defined as the greatest challenge of the twenty-first 
century, parliaments must show responsibility in order to 
remain politically legitimate (Faure et al., 2003, p. 22). 
 
CONCEPTUALISING COMPLIANCE WITH EU 
DIRECTIVES: VALUES AND ACTIONS 
National parliaments in Europe encounter difficulties 
transposing and implementing EU Directives. They do 
not always succeed in putting their beliefs into concrete 
policies, even when there seems to be a good ‘fit’. This 
phenomenon is described as the ‘value-action gap’. 
 
 
 
Blake’s model of the value-action gap 
Numerous theories explaining the value-action gap focus 
on the information deficit alone, assigning the existence 
of the gap to individuals being uninformed, and thereby 
unable to transform their environmental beliefs into 
concrete actions. Contrastingly, Blake’s model establishes 
three types of barriers explaining the gap. Individual 
barriers are located within individuals and can for 
instance be personality traits such as laziness or a lack of 
interest. Responsibility barriers are related to the locus of 
control. If individuals perceive the locus of control to be 
external to them, they feel incapable to influence or 
contribute to the fight against climate change. Practicality 
barriers comprise issues such as a lack of time, money, 
facilities or indeed information (Blake, 1999, p. 263-270). 
Unlike many other academics, Blake also acknowledges 
that the value-action gap is repeated on levels other than 
that of the individual, for instance in institutions and thus 
also parliaments. 
Implementation of EU Directives in the Four Worlds 
Falkner and Treib have researched processes of 
implementation of EU Directives in most European 
countries, and categorised them in four worlds, each with 
their own characteristics (Falkner & Treib, 2007, p. 2-10).  
 The world of law observance consists of Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden. These countries generally comply 
fast and well without problems in both the transposition 
and implementation stages. There seems to be a 
compliance culture in this world, meaning that 
compliance with EU legislation is a goal in itself and that 
the necessary infrastructure is present. 
 The world of domestic politics consists of Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. These countries decide on a case-to-
case basis whether a Directive will be adopted, based 
on its fit within the domestic political situation. 
Transposition can therefore be problematic, and 
variability amongst the countries in this world can be 
big. However, once transposition has occurred, 
implementation usually happens swiftly due to the 
presence of the developed infrastructure that is needed. 
 The world of transposition neglect consists of France, 
Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. These countries show 
a posture of national arrogance and compliance with EU 
Directives is no goal in itself. For these reasons, both 
transposition and implementation are relatively rare. 
 The world of dead letters consists of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. These countries usually transpose quite well, 
but lack the infrastructure needed for implementation. 
Moreover, the decision to transpose is also dependent 
on the domestic political situation, causing great 
variability in the transposition stage in this world. 
By differentiating between various types of transposition 
and implementation, new insights might be gained and 
systematic flaws may be discovered in the process of 
compliance with EU Directives, thereby enhancing the 
effectiveness of the Directives. 
Limitations of analysing implementation of Directives 
Mastenbroek identifies six variables which may cause 
misrepresentations when implementation is analysed. On 
the EU-level, first differing decision-making procedures 
(via the European Commission, Council, or Council and 
EP) may impact the speed of transposition. Here, also the 
quality (high or low) and topic (accepted or sensitive) of 
the Directive play a role. Second, the character of a 
Directive is important. A Directive introducing new 
legislation requires more deliberation than an amending 
Directive. Third, the deadline of a Directive may cause 
certain Directives to be prioritised over others 
(Mastenbroek, 2003, p. 375-376). On the national level, 
first the type of legal measure used to transpose a 
Directive may be time-efficient or time-consuming. 
Second, the fit of a Directive may require extensive 
measures in case of a misfit. Third, so-called Chinese 
walls between preparation of transposition and actual 
transposition may arise, such as miscommunication or 
conflicts of competence and interest (2003, p. 377). All of 
these variables may influence the compliance process. 
Methodology 
This paper assesses the value-action gap in four countries, 
each representing one of the Four Worlds of 
Implementation. Statements expressed by their national 
parliaments will serve as environmental ‘values’, whilst 
compliance with the ELD will be measured as ‘actions’. 
It is hypothesised that, because of the presence of the 
polluter-pays principle in both the ELD and the Kyoto 
Protocol, compliance with the ELD represents the 
operationalisation that parties ought to take in order to 
meet their Kyoto commitments. The value-action gap 
then becomes a helpful tool to critically assess to what 
extent countries are meeting their commitments, or what 
might hinder them in doing so.  
 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOUR WORLDS 
Sweden: world of law observance 
Sweden’s national parliament, Riksdagen, presents 
ambitious climate policies by wanting to be a strong 
performer nationally and internationally (Sveriges Riksdag, 
2006, p. 7-19). Their compliance with the ELD is also 
successful due to an impressive implementation of the 
Directive into national environmental legislation and the 
application of strict liability to all environmental damage 
(European Commission, 2013, p. 335-346). The successful 
compliance is in line with Falkner’s and Treib’s model for 
the world of law observance (Falkner & Treib, 2007, p. 
15). There is thus a match between bold environmental 
values and successful environmental actions, resulting in a 
narrow value-action gap in the Swedish case. 
United Kingdom: world of domestic politics 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
has presented the UK Climate Change Programme, 
approved of by parliament. Similarly to Sweden, the UK’s 
environmental values are bold as the country aims to be an 
international forerunner in fighting climate change (Her 
Majesty’s Government, 2006, p. iii). Yet, there are serious 
shortcomings in terms of transposition and implementation, 
as the ELD is introduced by means of numerous complex 
Regulations, preventing harmonisation with national 
environmental legislation. Moreover, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union has sanctioned the UK for its slow 
transposition. Water policy is the only successful 
component of the ELD (European Commission, 2013, p. 
357-368). The problematic compliance is one of the 
possibilities for the world of domestic politics in Falkner’s 
and Treib’s model, but it is unsure if it applies to all 
countries of this world (Falkner & Treib, 2007, p. 15). In 
any case, there is a mismatch between strong 
environmental values, but shortcomings in terms of actions, 
resulting in a wide value-action gap in the UK.  
Greece: world of transposition neglect 
Greece lacks a national climate strategy in which 
environmental values can be expressed. Therefore, the 
program for Sustainable Development presented by the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy in 2007 is the best 
alternative. Here, Greece acknowledges that in the field of 
sustainability and risk management, there are still major 
shortcomings in terms of infrastructure (Ελληνική 
∆ηµοκρατία Υπουργείο Περιβάλλοντος, 2007, p. 33-36). 
The country’s environmental values are thus not as high as 
these of Sweden and the UK. Compliance with the ELD is 
not so successful either, as no harmonisation exists between 
the ELD and national environmental legislation. Moreover, 
Greece has also been sanctioned by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union due to a two-and-a-half year delay in 
transposition of the ELD (European Commission, 2013, p. 
135-149). Yet, despite shortcomings in compliance, 
Greece’s value-action gap is quite narrow because of its 
acknowledgement of these shortcomings on the value-side. 
This is completely in line with Falkner’s and Treib’s model 
which classifies the world of transposition neglect as an 
unwilling and unsuccessful complier (Falkner & Treib, 
2007, p. 15). 
Italy: world of dead letters 
Italy’s first national climate policy dates from 2014, 
complicating the assessment of the value-action gap. 
Nonetheless, the country seems to recognise its 
responsibility in the fight against climate change and calls 
upon the status of ‘cultural heritage’ Italy’s understanding 
of climate change supposedly has (Ministero dell’Ambiente 
e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, 2014, p. 49). 
Moreover, Italy displays an overall desire to implement the 
ELD. Analysing Italy’s compliance with the ELD, the 
country generally performs well. For instance, it is the only 
one of the four countries studied to have transposed the 
ELD before the deadline. Yet, the mandatory strict liability 
is applied nowhere, seriously violating the basic principle 
of the ELD and causing the European Commission to start 
an infringement procedure against the country (European 
Commission, 2013, p. 201). This coincides with Falkner’s 
and Treib’s definition of the world of dead letters, as 
transposition goes well, but major shortcomings arise in the 
implementation stage (Falkner & Treib, 2007, p. 15). There 
is a mismatch between strong environmental values and 
weak environmental actions. Yet, more countries must be 
studied in the environmental case in order to determine 
whether transposition is always successful in this world. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has, with the help of Blake’s model, confirmed 
the existence and importance of the institutional value-
action gap, something which has largely been neglected 
by academics so far. By studying compliance with the 
ELD as operationalisation of the polluter-pays principle in 
the Kyoto Protocol, the efficiency of climate treaties has 
been analysed. The assessment of the value-action gap in 
the Environmental Four Worlds shows that Falkner’s and 
Treib’s model can be transferred without much problem 
to the environmental division. Sweden and Greece, the 
countries with narrow value-action gaps, are full 
representatives of the worlds of law observance and 
transposition neglect, as these worlds do not show great 
variability amongst the countries constituting these 
respective worlds. The United Kingdom and Italy, on the 
other hand, are only partially representatives of their 
respective worlds, as the worlds of domestic politics and 
dead letters do show differing results in the countries 
constituting them. More countries of the environmental 
worlds of domestic politics and dead letters need to be 
studied in order to conclude whether this variability 
occurs here too. Yet, it is still difficult to point out what 
exactly causes the (institutional) value-action gap to 
prevail. Although Blake’s barriers provide great insight, 
real life political situations cannot easily be improved by 
the abstract labels Blake’s barriers come with. Where in 
politics does lack of trust or lack of efficacy for instance 
exactly occur?  A combination of Blake’s barriers with 
Mastenbroek’s variables might help. Indeed, the response 
of national politics reveals whether a Directive is for 
instance politically sensitive, how well it fits and whether 
Chinese walls arise. Evaluating Mastenbroek’s variables 
in the light of Blake’s model – for instance, by linking 
political sensitivity to lack of encouragement, or Chinese 
walls to lack of facilities – may then help in decoding 
what exactly constitutes the value-action gap. 
 
All in all, as in no environmental world compliance is 
seamless, there is still a lot to gain in terms of 
transposition and implementation. The content of climate 
treaties is only one side of the coin: by improving 
compliance infrastructure and paying more attention to 
the differing compliance processes of the Environmental 
Four Worlds, international climate policy can be executed 
much more effectively. 
 
ROLE OF THE STUDENT 
Fascinated by the concept of the value-action gap and 
aware of its existence on the level of the individual, most 
notably in environmental psychology and consumerism, I 
wanted to investigate whether the gap was somehow linked 
to politics’ inability to respond effectively to pressing 
environmental issues. I discovered that the institutional 
value-action gap was, except for in Blake’s model, almost 
entirely absent in the academic world and wanted to 
highlight it more. Similarly, the problems in terms of 
infrastructure when complying with EU legislation felt as 
something that has been underestimated as a ‘silent killer’ 
in terms of effective execution of environmental policies. I 
have chosen the ELD and the Kyoto Protocol, as the results 
of compliance are already present and thus suitable for 
analysis. Hopefully, the Paris Agreement and future 
climate policy can benefit from my analysis and evoke the 
effects they promised to. 
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